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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000446

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

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NSC FOR GAVIN
LONDON FOR POL - LORD
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: [PREL](#) [MOPS](#) [QA](#) [SU](#) [LY](#) [CD](#)
SUBJECT: FM FAKI BRIEFS ON GHAZI VISIT RESULTS

REF: A. KHARTOUM 1146
[1](#)B. N'DJAMENA 438
[1](#)C. STATE 106594

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SUMMARY

[1](#)1. (SBU) FM Moussa Faki Mahamat called in DCM October 15 (Ambassador is traveling in Eastern Chad with MINURCAT) to provide a read-out of the October 10 discussions in N'Djamena among President Idriss Deby Itno, Sudanese Presidential Adviser Ghazi Salahhuddin, UN/AU Negotiator Djibrill Bassole, Faki himself and others (Refs A and B). Faki echoed Ghazi's own positive description (Ref A) of the potential that the past weekend's meetings offered for improved Chad-Sudan bilateral relations, but his description of steps to be taken in the coming weeks differed somewhat from Ghazi's. According to Faki, Chad and Sudan had agreed that as the first in a series of confidence-building measures, the GoS would find a location well inside the Sudan border to canton Chadian rebels who refused to return home. Once Chadian rebels had been rounded up, removed from areas bordering Chad, and "placed in a camp," the Chadian side would invite a Sudanese delegation to visit "the former JEM military base" at Am Jarras in Eastern Chad and/or other locations that the Sudanese wished to see, to prove that such sites were no longer militarized. When the Sudanese were satisfied that the JEM lacked bases from which to attack into Darfur, Faki would himself travel to Khartoum for meetings that would focus on additional confidence-building measures such as border monitoring, as envisioned in the 2006 Joint Protocol, etc. Faki said he could not predict how long the process might take, given that the most complex step from a technical standpoint was the first, to be carried out by Sudan. End Summary.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

[1](#)2. SBU FM Faki, who will be traveling internationally beginning this evening until October 24, told DCM that both the visiting Ghazi delegation and their Chadian hosts had approached the October 10 bilateral meetings with the goal of improving relations and finding ways to reestablish lasting

peace. President Deby had been "frank and direct" with Ghazi and those who accompanied him, including governors of North and West Darfur and military and security experts. Deby had recalled for the Sudanese "the context of current relations" between Chad and Sudan, which in his description included Sudanese "disinformation" in the course of the summer about alleged Chadian attacks on Sudan, as well as continuing support for Chadian rebels who had made military moves on Chad as recently as five months previously, and who continued to threaten the Chadian border. Chadian rebels supported by Sudan retained as their aim the overthrow of the Chadian government, Deby had pointed out. Chad, by contrast, had no aggressive intentions vis-a-vis Sudan, with which it had maintained good relations until the Darfur crisis.

13. (SBU) According to Faki, Deby had conceded to Ghazi that "I have been closing my eyes to JEM comings and goings," out of frustration that the Sudanese regime was trying to divert attention from the problems it had caused in Darfur by provoking Chad. Deby had also told Ghazi that "if you can guarantee that the Chadian rebels are not in a position to threaten Chad, we will let you verify that the JEM is well and truly gone from Chad." Deby had in mind "a strong initial signal from Sudan," consisting of a Sudanese effort to canton all remaining Chadian rebels well inside the Sudanese border. The location would "have to have wells and other things" so that the rebels would not continually stray in the direction of Chad. (NOTE: Faki did not specifically rule out the Ain Sirro site where some Chad rebels have been located during this summer's rainy season, but neither did he suggest that Chad thought an appropriate cantonment had been found as of yet. END NOTE.) Once Chadian rebels were no longer in a position to threaten Chad -- Faki said that it might take several weeks or longer -- Chad would invite a Sudanese delegation into Chad to look at Am Jarras and/or other former JEM military sites, to prove that Chad was not giving succor

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to the JEM. Faki stressed that Deby was prepared to give up the JEM in exchange for improved bilateral ties with Sudan, and that Deby had tried to make this clear to Ghazi. Once the Sudanese were satisfied that Chad was not aiding the JEM, Faki continued, he himself would travel to Khartoum for meetings at which discussion would continue on confidence-building measures such as those envisioned in the 2006 Sudan-Chad Joint Protocol, including border monitoring. The Chadian side hoped to interest the international community (including potentially MINURCAT and UNAMID) in assisting with or advising on how to conduct such monitoring.

JEM OF THE FUTURE?

14. (SBU) DCM pointed out that JEM leaders had recently been, and perhaps still were, in N'Djamena, a situation that made our authorities in Washington -- and the Sudanese -- intensely nervous. Faki said that he believed Djibril Ibrahim might still be in N'Djamena in connection with an inheritance from an older brother, but Khalil appeared to have "gone back East." "We don't want these guys here," Faki continued. But keeping them away was difficult, as they did have family and property in N'Djamena. DCM noted that rumors of JEM weapons purchases, perhaps with the knowledge of Chadian officials, continued to circulate, and to provoke considerable anxiety among U.S. policymakers. Faki replied that "we can't resolve everything at once," but stressed that Chadian government interlocutors with the JEM had been making clear for many months that Chad expected the JEM "to participate in negotiations, lay down arms, and assume the posture of a political movement -- inside Darfur, not from Chad."

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE EAST

¶5. (SBU) DCM asked whether the GoC had any reason to believe that Chadian rebels were currently still near the border, as they had been the previous week, apparently in the company of Minni Minawi units. "We continue to get reports of armed groups making forays toward Chad," said Faki, who asked the U.S. to put pressure on Sudan in the aim of preventing such developments. Faki then allowed as how "there are some on both sides who don't want peace," including within respective governments. Faki said he attributed persistent -- but consistently false -- reports of ANT military build-up in the East to "some within the Sudanese command who are used to selling information and are not ready to give this practice up." Faki made clear that he had very much appreciated his October 7 conversations with A/S Carson (Ref C), during which he hoped he had disabused Carson of the notion that a recent spate of reports was true.

FAKI'S TRAVELS

¶6. (SBU) Faki termed the current situation, both on the ground and diplomatically, "fragile but promising." He advised DCM that he was headed to Saudi Arabia to try to convince Riyadh to resend an Ambassador to Chad and reopen its Embassy here (closed since the then-Saudi Ambassador's wife was killed in the 2008 rebel attacks.) From Riyadh, he would travel to Kampala for meetings on refugee management and global issues. He made clear that he would be available to the USG throughout his trip, should officials wish to confer with him on any aspects of follow-up to the Ghazi visit or other matters. He reiterated that current lack of trust between Chad and Sudan compelled each side to take steps that the other could verify, ideally with multilateral observation an eventual part of the process.
NIGRO